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Does NEPA Require an Impact Statement on Inaction? 
The legal distinction between action and inaction has occasioned 
deep confusion for generations. 1 Unfortunately, statutory language 
and judicial interpretation have extended this confusion to the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).2 Section 
102(2)(C) of the Act requires that "all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment shall . . . include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official of- (i) the environmental im-
pact of the proposed action . . . ."3 Virtually every phrase has gen-
erated litigation.4 
While "federal action" clearly includes projects proposed and 
conducted by a federal agency,5 it also includes federal participation 
I. The distinction has exerted the most influence in the law of torts. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314,323 (1977); Kuntz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 
(9th Cir. 1975); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 
(N.Y. 1809). "These distinctions are not simplified by the semantic fact that any action can be 
described in negative terms, such that doing nothing amounts to the failure to do something, 
and doing something amounts to the failure to do nothing." Note, Statutory and Common Law 
Considerations in Defining the Tort Liability of Public Employee Unions to Private Citizens for 
Damages Inflicted by Illegal Strikes, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1271, 1297 n.147 (1982). 
2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347, 
436 I ( 1976). 
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § I02(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
The relevant text of § 102 reads: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (I) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in 
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal 
Government shall -
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
4. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); Dreyfus & Ingram, The National En-
vironmental Policy Act: A View ef Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 256-$7 
(1976); Wichelman,Administrative Agency Implementation efthe National Environmental Policy 
Act ef 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining D!lferential Response, 16 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 263, 267-69, 273-74 (1976). 
5. A determination would still have to be made that the action is a "major" one that "sig-
nificantly affects the quality of the human environment." Courts have differed as to whether 
these two phrases create two independent tests, or whether federal actions which "signifi-
cantly" affect the environment are inherently "major." See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE 
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in state or private activity,6 and federal approval of state or private 
activity that could not lawfully proceed without such approval.7 
Plaintiffs in NEPA litigation have advanced the theory that acquies-
cence by a federal agency in nonf ederal activities known to the 
agency and subject to prohibition at its discretion belong in the cate-
gory of federal action. Courts, however, have been reluctant to ac-
cept such an interpretation of section 102(2)(C) for fear of 
overburdening federal agencies with EIS preparations.8 
This Note considers the question of whether NEPA requires an 
EIS in cases of official refusal to exercise discretionary agency au-
COURTS 89-96 (1973); Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact State-
ment Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 63, 68-69 ( 1980/81) [hereinafter cited as 
Shea]; Note, Inaction as Action Under Section 102(2/{C) of the National Em•ironmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 58 TEX. L. REV. 393, 396 n.27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, l11actio11 as 
Action]. 
6. See, e.g., San Antonio Conservation Socy. v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d l013 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); No East-West Highway Comm., Inc. v. Whitaker, 
403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975); Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. l002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 
Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
7. See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (approval by the Dept. of 
Interior of a lease of Indian lands); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 
455 F.2d 412, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (authorization by the FPC of a 
transmission line construction project of the Power Authority of the State of New York); Jones 
v. United States Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 591-92 (E.D. La. 1974) 
(HUD approval of transfer of ownership of housing project). See also Scientists' Inst. for Pub. 
Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d l079, !089 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Commission's breeder reactor 
program was "developing a technology which will permit utility companies to take action af-
fecting the environment by building LMFBR [liquid metal fast breeder reactor] power plants," 
Thus the court held that "there is 'Federal action' within the meaning of the statute [NEPA) 
not only when an agency proposes to build a facility itself. but also whenever an agency makes 
a decision which permits action by other parties which will affect the quality of the environ-
ment." 481 F.2d at l088. 
8. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Dept. of Interior's 
acquiescence in Alaska wolf-kill on federal land did not require EIS). The wolf-kill case was 
also litigated in the Ninth Circuit with the same result. Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th 
Cir. 1979). See Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Assn. v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572, 580 (9th Cir, 
1974) (EIS not required where Dept. of Interior failed to object to a leasing program); Chesa-
peake Bay Found. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 453 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1978) (No 
EIS was required on the failure of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to object to a 
state grant of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). The decision rested, however, on the ground that 
FWPCA state programs are established under state law and function in lieu of a federal pro-
gram, with no delegation of federal authority. 453 F. Supp. at 126-27.). 
In Gemeinschaft zum Shutz des Berliner v. Marienthal, 12 Env. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337 
(D.D.C. 1978), plaintiffs sought to require the U.S. Army to prepare an EIS due to its failure to 
object to construction of an apartment building by the German government. Although the 
Army had authority to intervene, the court found no major federal action. This decision, 
however, may have teen prompted by the court's recognition that '1udicial interference in the 
German government's actions ... raises serious foreign policy implications." 
See also Fergenson, The Sin of Omission: Inaction as Action Under Section 102(2/{C) oft/1e 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 53 IND. L.J. 497 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Fergenson] (arguing against the inclusion of inaction as major federal action under NEPA). 
But see Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5 (arguing that inaction should be included as 
action under NEPA); see note 91 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
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thority. Part I develops the competing theories for resolving this 
question. The current judicial attitude, which has excluded impor-
tant cases with far-reaching environmental effects from the EIS re-
quirement, plainly frustrates the statute's procedural purposes. 
Regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality 
define "major federal action" to include the failure to act under cer-
tain circumstances, and offer one alternative to the current approach. 
But the regulations condition the classification of inaction as action 
upon reviewability under the Administrative Procedures Act, signifi-
cantly limiting the regulation's scope. This approach would expand 
NEPA's reach to an extremely important category of cases, while the 
limits on the review of agency inaction contained in the AP A suggest 
that following the regulations would impose no more than reason-
able burdens on agency decisionmaking. The regulations, therefore, 
suggest the minimal degree to which agency inaction with significant 
effects on the environment should require an EIS. But the problem-
atic nature of reviewability under the AP A, and the danger of 
neglecting environmental values in the type of case likely to escape 
the EIS requirement under the regulations, suggest the need for a 
more comprehensive regime for incorporating environmental con-
cerns into agency decisions not to act. The superior approach would 
be to view the plaintiff's request for an exercise of authority as a 
"proposal for . . . major federal action." This interpretation harmo-
nizes the language and purpose of the statute, subject to no objection 
other than the apprehension of paralyzing agencies with the burden 
of responding to obstructionist demands for impact statements. This 
apprehension, however, inheres in any interpretation that honors 
NEP A's purpose to account for environmental values in the formu-
lation of public policy. Part II, therefore, turns to a consideration of 
standards for limiting the application of Section 102(2)(C) in cases 
where the government declines to take a proposed major action. 
These standards should dispel any fear that requiring an EIS when 
the government refuses to take "major federal action" will mire pol-
icy implementation in a legal morass. 
l. APPLYING SECTION 102(2)(C) IN CASES OF AGENCY INACTION 
A. The Current Judicial Approach: Exempting Inaction from the 
EIS Requirement 
The application of section 102(2)(C) to agency inaction arises 
when the agency is requested to exercise its authority to prevent 
nonfederal activity that may threaten the environment.9 .Defenders of 
9. Inaction that implicates NEPA will be defined as (l) federal agency authority to prohibit 
planned nonfederal activity (2) which would significantly affect the environment and (3) 
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Wildl!fe v. Andrus 10 offers a concrete illustration of the problem. 
Plaintiffs sought to compel the Department of the Interior to prepare 
an EIS on a wolf-kill the State of Alaska planned to conduct on fed-
eral land. 11 The Department of Interior had apparent preventive 
powers under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976, yet failed to exercise its authority. The District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals found no federal action because the De-
partment's acquiescence did not constitute an "overt act."12 The 
court held that NEPA requires no EIS in such a case, thus allowing 
the Interior Department to acquiesce in an arguably destructive 
nonfederal project without the full environmental analysis provided 
by an EIS. Had the Department proposed to conduct the extermina-
tion program itself, an EIS would clearly have been mandated. Reli-
ance on an action/inaction distinction removed the former case from 
the EIS requirement despite its identical environmental impact, even 
when "inaction" resulted from a conscious decision not to act. 13 
agency acquiescence in the nonfederal activity. See Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5, at 
393. 
The necessity of major federal action supplies the first element of the definition, Without 
agency authority to control or stop the nonfederal project or program, no federal involvement 
would exist to activate NEPA. "For action to be subject to NEPA ... it must be shown to be 
'federal.'" Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323,327 (9th Cir. 1975); Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 E.R.C. 2111, 2113 (D.D.C. 1977) ("For plaintiffs to prevail on their 
NEPA ... claims, there must be some authority to prevent the wolf kill on these federal 
lands. Absent such authority, there could be no federal action for purposes of the applicability 
of NEPA .... "). 
NEP A's requirement of major federal action mandates the second element. Since the ac-
tion here is a refusal to exercise authority, however, "major" in this context is probably a 
function of the effect on the environment of the nonfederal activity. Thus, in an inaction case, 
determinations of "major" and "significantly affecting the .•. environment" are identical. 
See note 5 supra. 
The third element arises from NEPA's requirement of major federal action. The word 
"action" at a minimum requires a decision by the federal agency. "Without a Federal decision 
- whether that decision be to act or to refrain from acting - there can be no 'major Federal 
action' under NEPA." Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1247 n.6 (1980) (quot-
ing letter from Nicholas Yost, General Counsel of the Council on Environmental Quality to 
the Department of Justice (January 10, 1979)). In a case of inaction, the action upon which an 
EIS would be prepared is the acquiescence in the nonfederal activity, following a conscious 
decision. 
10. 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
11. The planned kill involved 60% of the wolves in an area of 35,000 square miles in the 
interior of Alaska. 627 F.2d at 1240. 
12. 627 F.2d at 1245. 
13. The court in .Defenders of Wildl!fe v. Andrus contended that agency planning must 
"ripen" into a proposal for action before NEPA can reasonably apply; thus a decision not to 
act is properly left outside the scope of the statute. 627 F.2d at 1243-44. The Supreme Court 
decisions in Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979), and Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 
390 (1976), provided the authority for that contention. The application of those decisions to 
the questions of agency inaction is inappropriate because those cases dealt with completely 
different factual settings. Andrus v. Sierra Club held that NEPA does not require the prepara• 
tion ofan EIS for appropriations requests. 412 U.S. at 364-65. Kleppe involved national coal 
development projects, some in the Northern Great Plains region. The Court held that a re-
gional EIS was not required on the coal development projects in the Northern Great Plains 
because a distinct regional program was not proposed. 427 U.S. at 398-409. Furthermore, the 
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The court appeared to base this result on the statutory lan-
guage, 14 but the "plain meaning" 15 of "action" 16 is exceedingly un-
Court noted that EISs had already been prepared on both the national program and the indi-
vidual local projects. 427 U.S. at 400 n.10. 
Hence the dicta in these decisions arose in a context entirely different from the considera-
tion of the inaction problem. The unreasonableness of preparing an EIS on every appropria-
tions request or on every possible geographical subset of a national program is fairly clear: in 
the former case the burden would be oppressive and in the latter the effort would be largely 
redundant and wasteful. The same objections do not apply a priori to agency inaction. 
Two fallacies inhere in the Defenders of Wi/d/!fe opinion's application of the ripeness argu-
ment to inaction: (I) a decision not to interfere with nonfederal action, being the agency's final 
decision, cannot "ripen" any further into a proposal for action; and (2) because an agency 
decides not to intervene does not mean that there is no proposed action on which to prepare an 
EIS. Rather, an EIS could be prepared on either the environmental effects of allowing the 
nonfederal action to proceed, or on the environmental impact of prohibiting the private activ-
ity, i.e., the "major federal action" proposed by the plaintiffs. See notes 72-74 infra and ac-
companying text. The result would be the same in either case, because section 102(2)(C) of 
NEPA requires consideration of "alternatives to the proposed action" in the EIS. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 433(2)(C)(iii). It follows that whether the EIS focuses on the impact of inaction, or on the 
action rejected by the agency, it will always involve a comparison of the environmental conse-
quences of action and inaction. Thus, the argument that an agency's planning must "ripen" 
into a proposal for action before NEPA applies depends on authority and reasoning quite 
inapplicable to the agency inaction context. 
14. The court candidly "acknowledge[d) the truth" of plaintiff's argument that "the pur-
pose of the statute is to ensure that environmentally informed decisions are made, not simply 
that the environmental consequences of all federal programs are considered," but did "not 
understand it to change the language of the statute." 627 F.2d at 1243. Other than this openly 
"literal and formalistic" reading of the statute, 627 F.2d at 1245, Judge McGowan relied only 
on a prudential fear of overtaxing federal agencies to justify the requirement of an "overt act" 
627 F.2d at 1246, although the result in the case at bar could have rested on whether or not the 
Secretary of the Interior actually had authority to prevent the wolf-kill. 627 F.2d at 1247-50. 
Thus, a principled interpretation of the statutory language which would incorporate cases of 
inaction without unduly burdening federal agencies would satisfy the court's objections to 
requiring an EIS in the absence of an "overt act." 
15. The starting point for statutory construction, is, of course, the language itself. See, e.g., 
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 681-82 
(1950); United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942). Generally, 
the words of statutes reflect their ordinary meanings. See Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. 
GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1980); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (per 
curiam). 
16. Dictionary definitions of "action" vary considerably: 
I: a deliberative or authorized proceeding 
lb(2): an act or decision by an executive or legislative body 
2a: the bringing about of an alteration by force or through some natural agency 
3: the process of doing; exertion of energy 
4: a voluntary act of will that manifests itself externally ... or that may be com-
pleted internally (as in contemplation) 
5a: a thing done - deed. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 21 (1971). Black's Law Dictionary defines action 
as "[c]onduct; behavior; something done; the condition of acting; an act or series of acts." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 26 (5th ed. 1979). These definitions are either self-referential ("an 
act") or too vague to exclude inaction ("a voluntary act of will"). The definition most likely 
assumed by the Congress is that adopted by the Administrative Procedure Act, that " 'agency 
action' includes the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976) (emphasis supplied). 
A second possible choice of meaning is "the bringing about of an alteration by force or 
through some natural agency." This definition would limit the section to projects performed 
by an agency and thus would exclude inaction. Judicial interpretation of major federal action 
1342 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1337 
clear. 17 Congress evidently understood the potential scope of the Act 
only imperfectly, 18 and NEP A's formal legislative history corre-
spondingly offers little guidance.19 But there is nothing unclear 
as including mere approval by a federal agency of nonfederal programs and projects already 
has rejected this interpretation. See note 7 supra. 
Action as "a thing done" leaves considerable ambiguity. A thing done could include an 
agency project or simply an agency decision acquiescing in a nonfederal program. The gener-
ality of the words permits a varied interpretation of this definition. 
Action could be defined as decisions resulting in an exercise of agency authority - "overt 
acts." The "overt act" definition was espoused in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 
1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court gave as examples of overt acts requiring an EIS the 
issuance of a lease or a right-of-way permit, or the approval of a mining plan. Although this 
definition can be supported on policy grounds, e.g., relief for feceral agencies from the burden 
of preparing EISs, it is not obviously superior to the first definition postulated. 
17. Mechanistic reliance on statutory language susceptible to alternative interpretations is 
ill-calculated to advance the intent of Congress. The plain meaning rule is "rather an axiom of 
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence [of 
legislative intent] if it exists." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 
(1928) (per Holmes, J .). "[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurispru-
dence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have 
some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the 
surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), '!ffd, 326 U.S. 
404 (1945) (per Hand, J.). The grand generality ofNEPA's language, interpreted as a mandate 
for the courts to fashion environmental co=on law, significantly reinforces deference to stat-
utory purpose over statutory language. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 642 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (The Act is a "statute whose meaning is more uncertain 
than most, not merely because it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of its 
phrasing."); F. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 56 ("Congress' rather general language necessarily 
places on agencies and courts the burden of spelling out the precise scope of the Act."). The 
courts, moreover, have consistently given NEPA a liberal interpretation to effectuate its pur-
poses, particularly in light of the congressional directive to fulfill NEPA's mandate to "the 
fullest extent possible." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. 
United States Atomic Energy Co=n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Hanly v. 
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (NEPA construed broadly to cover protection of 
quality of life for urban residents); Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corri-
dor v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 486 F. Supp. 707, 712 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (stand-
ing requirements liberally applied to allow workers threatened with job loss to sue under 
NEPA); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 389 
F. Supp. 689, 700 (D.D.C. 1974) (notice provisions for SEC rulemaking interpreted liberally to 
protect general public in the context of NEPA); Citizens Organized to Defend the Environ-
ment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ("major Federal action" broadly 
construed). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1966) (importance of 
a clean environment warrants a broad interpretation of the Rivers and Habors Act of 1899); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 84 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (lib-
eral interpretation of Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972). ("[T]he sympathetic and imaginative discovery" of NEPA's purpose virtually dictates 
including at least certain agency failures to act within the meaning of "major federal action.") 
See notes 28-33 iefra and accompanying text. 
18. "Most members of Congress ... probably did not appreciate the potential scope and 
significance of the measure [NEPA]." Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 4, at 243. See ANDREWS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 17 (1976). 
19. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 2751; H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG, 
& Ao. NEWS 2767; S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
An argument has been advanced that a reference in a co=ittee report on NEPA to public 
"indignation and protest over the actions or, in some cases, the lack of action of Federal agen-
cies" shows that Congress "knew how to say 'inaction' when that is what it meant." Fergen-
son, supra note 8, at 511 ( quoting the report of the Senate Co=ittee on Internal and Insular 
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about the underlying procedural purposes of the Act, and exempting 
cases of agency inaction from the EIS requirement plainly frustrates 
those objectives. 
In Section 101, NEPA announces a national environmental pol-
icy whose broad purpose is "to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony .... "20 
Section 102 sets up administrative procedures designed to implement 
that policy.21 Section 102(2)(C) requires that all federal agencies 
prepare an EIS before embarking on any "major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the . . . environment . . . ."22 This provision 
serves two related functions. First, the preparation of an EIS more 
fully informs agency decision-makers, by requiring that they con-
sider environmental values before the choice of policies is made. 23 
Affairs, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969)). The quote upon which this argument 
relies appeared in a general discussion of the purpose of NEPA. An assertion that the quote 
indicates congressional intent to exclude inaction from the coverage of§ l02(2)(C) is strained 
at best. The quote was followed by examples of public concern and then by the statement that 
"S. 1075 is designed to deal with many of the basic causes of these increasingly troublesome 
and often critical problems of domestic policy." S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). 
Thus, the Report may be read as a congressional attempt to deal with the problem of lack of 
action, not an intent to exclude it from the bill. Other examples in the legislative history con-
firm this interpretation. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) ("In the past, 
environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the 
early stages of planning because of the difficulty of evaluating them in comparison with eco-
nomic and technical factors. As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at 
the policy level - and this often means the Congress - environmental enhancement opportuni-
ties may beforegone and unnecessary degradation incurred." (emphasis added)). 
Seizing upon isolated references to NEPA's legislative history, however, does little to ad-
vance an argument one way or another on the question of requiring an EIS in cases of inac-
tion. As in many cases of statutory construction, the legislators probably did not specifically 
consider the inaction possibility. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 1-2 (Congress never gave 
full consideration to the agency-level operation of the statute); Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 
4, at 254 ( deriving the intent of Congress with respect to section l 02 from the legislative history 
amounts to ''voodoo"). But statutes are not limited to the specific examples in the minds of 
the legislators at the time of passage. See McGill v. Environmental Protection Agency, 593 
F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 1975): 
It would be sophistry for us to divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not con-
sider. Nor would it be permissible for us simply to withhold judgement on the basis that 
there is no law to apply. Instead we must attempt, at least in part intuitively, to determine 
how we think Congress would have voted had the question been raised legislatively. 
See also J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 165 (1909) ("[T)he difficulties of 
so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature had no meaning at all . . . when what the 
judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was 
present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its 
mind, if the point had been present."). 
20. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § l0l(a), 42 U.S.C. §433l(a) (1976). 
21. Section 102 presents "action-forcing procedures which will help to ensure that the poli-
cies enunciated in section 101 are implemented." 115 CONG. REC. 40,419 (1969) (exhibit 2, a 
section by section analysis of the proposed NEPA, offered by Senator Jackson in presenting 
NEPA conference report). 
22. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 565 F.2d 1060, 1071 (8th Cir. 
1977); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 922 (1977); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1976) (''The 
object of [NEPA] is to require agencies to consider environmental issues when making deci-
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This purpose reflects the congressional perception that those respon-
sible for public decisions too often ignored environmental values un-
defended by any self-interested constituency.24 Second, the 
dissemination of the EIS contributes to the accountability of deci-
sion-makers. NEPA does not mandate particular results, or em-
power the courts to substitute their judgment for that of executive 
agencies.25 Rather, the Act leaves to the political process the evalua-
tion of the informed value choices made by the responsible offi-
cials.26 The EIS requirement advances the functioning of the 
democratic process by identifying the environmental values at stake 
in particular decisions, and communicating to the public how those 
values fared in the ultimate formulation of policy.27 
The courts have liberally construed the statute to effectuate these 
purposes. Section 102 mandates compliance "to the fullest extent 
sions."); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 821 (5th Cir. 1975) ("NEPA's procedural re• 
quirements do not exist to dictate form but to insure that judgments are no longer based on old 
values."); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 
1973); Scientists' Inst. for Public Information, Inc., v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d at 
1079-88 ("The statutory phrase 'actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment' 
is intentionally broad, reflecting the Act's attempt to promote an across-the-board adjustment 
in federal decision making so as to make the quality of the environment a concern of every 
federal agency."); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States 
Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) ("NEPA was in• 
tended to effect substantive changes in decisionmaking."); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 
455 F.2d 650,656 (10th Cir. 1971) ("As we view it then the purposes of NEPA are realized by 
requiring the agencies to assess environmental consequences informulating policies, and by 
insuring that the governmental agencies shall pay heed to environmental considerations by 
compelling them to follow out NEPA procedures." (emphasis added)). For a general explica-
tion of NEPA's.purposes, see Note, EIS Supplements far Improperly Completed Projects, A 
Logical Extension of Judicial Review Under NEPA, 81 MICH. L. Rev. 221, 223-26 (1982) (lack 
of self-interested political support for environmental values leads Congress to adopt proce-
dural requirements to ensure consideration of otherwise neglected ecological concerns; EIS 
process informs decisionmaking, advances democratic accountability, and provides a record 
for judicial review). 
24. The legislative history supports this conclusion. See S. REP. No. 296, supra note 19, at 
9 ("One of the major factors contributing to environmental abuse and deterioration is that 
actions - often having irreversible consequences - are undertaken without adequate consid• 
eration of, or knowledge about, their impact on the environment."); note 19 supra. While of 
little guidance on narrow questions of definition, the legislative history unmistakably indicates 
the legislative intent to ensure the consideration of environmental values in the formation of 
public policy. 
25. See Stry~ker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) 
(per curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978). But the reviewing court can enjoin a project where the agency 
has given "clearly insufficient weight" to environmental concerns, pending an adequate EIS. 
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1977). 
26. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub!. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1299-300 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972). 
27. E.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The narrow 
purposes of the EIS requirement are to inform the public and agency decisionmakers of the 
environmental consequences of federal action .... "); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Qual-
ity, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851 (1973) (''The environmental impact statement required by 
NEPA is to serve as a basis for consideration of environmental factors by the agency involved 
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possible."28 The legislative history indicates that this language im-
poses a strict burden on the agencies and that "no agency shall util-
ize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory 
authorizations to avoid compliance."29 Courts have often looked to 
this language in giving the EIS requirement a broad scope.30 In Cal-
vert Cl!lfs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission,31 one of the first cases to interpret NEPA, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the procedural 
provisions of section 102 "establish a strict standard of compli-
ance."32 According to the court, "the requirement of environmental 
consideration 'to the fullest extent possible' sets a high standard for 
and is to provide a basis for critical evaluation by those not associated with the agency."); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
. In Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973), the court set out three basic purposes of the 
EIS requirement: 
l.) "First, it permits the court to ascertain whether the agency has made a good faith 
effort to take into account the values NEPA seeks to safeguard. 482 F.2d at 1284. 
2.) "Second, it serves as an environmental full disclosure law, providing information 
that Congress thought the public should have concerning the particular environmental 
costs involved in a project." 482 F.2d at 1285. 
3.) "Finally, and perhaps most substantively, the requirement of a detailed statement 
helps insure the integrity of the process of decision by precluding stubborn problems or 
serious criticism from being swept under the rug." 482 F.2d at 1285. 
28. See note 3 supra. 
29. The purpose of the new language ["to the fullest extent possible"] is to make it clear 
that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in 
such subparagraphs (A) through (H) unless the existing law applicable to such agency's 
operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impos-
sible. . . . Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest extent 
possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with 
the directives set out in section 102. Rather, the language in section 102 is intended to 
assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out 
in said section "to the fullest extent possible" under their statutory authorizations and that 
no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory authori-
zations to avoid compliance. 
H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
2767, 2770. 
30. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 51 I F.2d 489,495 (2d Cir. 1975); Louisiana v. Federal Power 
Commn., 503 F.2d 844, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 
46S-66 (5th Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972); No East-West Highway Comm. v. Whitaker, 
403 F. Supp. 260,270 (D.N.H. 1975); Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124-25 (E.D. Va. 
1972). 
The broad scope appropriate to the EIS requirement has been analyzed as follows: 
Some direct light on the scope of § 102(2)(C) is shed by the examples of degradation in 
NEP A's legislative history. These examples, coupled with the clear intent of Congress to 
lay a substantial share of the blame at the feet of ineffectual federal environmental efforts, 
argue implicitly for the widest possible application for the action-forcing clause .... 
Support for vigorous implementation of§ 102(2)(C) and for a wide reading of its provi-
sions is contained in the introductory language of § 102 requiring compliance ''to the 
fullest extent possible." 
F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS IO (1973). See also ANDREWS, supra note 18, at 17-18; 
Shea, supra note 5, at 70. 
31. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
32. 449 F.2d at 1112. 
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the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the 
reviewing courts."33 
The court's later refusal to extend this reasoning to cases of inac-
tion abdicates the judicial responsibility to vindicate the important 
purposes underlying the EIS requirement. The environmental im-
pact of inaction can be as significant as that caused by agency 
projects. A federal agency may know of impending nonfederal ac-
tivity which may affect the environment and which the federal 
agency has authority to stop. Its decision not to intervene, thereby 
allowing the activity to proceed, results in an environmental impact 
identical to that which would occur if the federal agency itself con-
ducted the activity.34 This anomaly illustrates the frustration of 
NEPA policies inherent in exempting inaction cases from the EIS 
provision: in both cases a policy choice may imperil environmental 
values, but in the inaction case the procedural requirements of the 
Act would not ensure the consideration of those values by the re-
sponsible officials. 
Section 102's purpose is "to get all the cards on the table prior to 
'any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.' "35 In 
the case of the Alaskan wolf-kill, the facts regarding the environ-
mental impact of the wolf extermination program were absent from 
the Interior Department's decision to acquiesce in the program. The 
"cards" were not on the table before the potentially irreversible and 
irretrievable decision to allow the extermination of the wolf packs.36 
Thus the Department arrived at an important environmental deci-
sion without a formal assessment of the environmental consequences 
of its decision, 37 and without informing the public of the weight ac-
33. 449 F.2d at 1114. See notes 118-20 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
34. Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5, at 405 n.76. 
35. Essex County Preservation Assn. v. Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208, 214 (D. Mass. 1975) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1976)), qffd, 536 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1976). 
36. According to one court, "(a) primary purpose of NEPA is to consider long-range effects 
and examine environmental consequences before there are 'irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources.'" Chelsea Neighborhood Assns. v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. 
Supp. 1171, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
"[I]rreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources," NEPA § 102(2)(C)(v), is as 
likely to result from a nonfederal activity as from a federal project. If such a commitment of 
resources is going to occur on federal land, as in the wolf-kill case, then a federal agency with 
power to prohibit such an impact should be required to include environmental factors in the 
decision on whether or not to allow the activity to proceed. 
37. An EIS must be prepared at the earliest possible time "so that it can serve practically as 
an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or 
justify decisions already made." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1981) (Council on Environmental Quali-
ty regulations). See Goplerud, NEPA al Nine: Alive and Well, or Wounded in Action?, 55 N.D. 
L. REv. 497, 515-16 (1979). Thus an action/inaction distinction is totally inappropriate be-
cause the very function of an EIS in an inaction case is to assist in the decision on whether or 
not to intervene in the nonfederal activity. Arguing that an EIS is not required on the decision 
not to intervene (i.e., inaction) is to argue that the EIS is irrelevant to the decisionmaking 
process. The purpose of the EIS is to educate the federal agency and the public, and poten-
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corded to those consequences by political decisionmakers theoreti-
cally accountable to the polity. This frustration of accountability 
assumes greater importance in inaction cases, because in contrast to 
the initiation of new programs, the decision to maintain the status 
quo does not trigger public comment and political debate. An infor-
mal decision is likely to reflect the values of a small group of indi-
viduals and probably will escape the public scrutiny which 
inevitably results from the preparation and distribution of an EIS.38 
These concerns have lead the courts to require, unanimously, an 
EIS when federal approval of a lease or license must precede 
nonfederal activity significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment. An agency's decision whether to grant a permit for nonfederal 
activity affecting the environment at least requires study to deter-
mine whether the effect on the environment would be significant. 
For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,39 
the court required the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to pre-
pare an EIS on the decision to grant a permit for livestock grazing on 
federal land. But the need to include environmental factors in an 
agency decision on whether or not to stop a nonfederal activity with 
potentially significant environmental impact is as great as the need 
to incorporate such factors in a decision to grant a permit for similar 
activity. If the BLM had not required a permit, but became aware of 
proposed grazing and enjoyed authority to stop it, the decision not to 
challenge the grazing would not require an EIS under the .Defenders 
of Wild/fie definition of major federal action. The distinction be-
tween these two cases does not depend on the importance of the de-
cision being made or on the need to consider environmental impacts, 
but on the formality of the permit process. 
The exclusion of inaction from major federal action also fur-
nishes the opportunity for deliberate evasion of NEPA's require-
ments. A federal agency attempting to carry out an environmentally 
sensitive project can allow a state agency to carry out the project in 
return for federal implementation of a less controversial project de-
sired by the state agency. This situation arose in No East-West High-
tially to change the decision of the agency when the environmental impacts of the alternate 
courses become clear. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
38. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 566 (1965): 
There is considerable justification for an insistence on procedural and formal requisites, 
since policymaking by a small group of political appointees may be objectionably 
nonrepresentative. 
Deference to administrative decision making assumes procedures which assure a fair 
hearing to the affected interests and a demonstration that the action is grounded on a 
bona fide intention to implement the legislative purposes. 
Thus, the EIS ensures a "fair hearing" for environmental concerns and exposes how well the 
agency is following NEP A's mandate in its informal decisions. 
39. 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), ajfg. 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 913 (1976). 
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way Committee, Inc. v. Whitaker ,40 a suit alleging construction of a 
highway in violation of NEPA. The plaintiffs demanded prepara-
tion of an EIS on a segment of a state/federal highway project that 
was being constructed solely by the state. The district court held that 
construction of the segment constituted major federal action, since 
A failure to so apply NEPA would create a situation where our na-
tion's highways would be built on a "patchwork basis" with the states 
constructing those highway portions which are the most environmen-
tally controversial with their own funds, and using federal funds to 
construct those portions which pose no environmental threat.41 
The potential for avoiding the requirements of NEPA on certain en-
vironmentally controversial projects defeats the goals of informing 
decisionmakers and the public about the impacts of federal action.42 
"Stubborn problems" and "serious criticism" could simply be "swept 
under the rug."43 
This analysis suggests that exempting cases of official inaction 
from the EIS requirement is unrequired by NEPA's language and 
repugnant to its purpose. It remains to arrive at an alternative inter-
pretation through the principled exercise of legal method. The Note 
therefore proceeds to a consideration of alternative interpretations. 
B. Administrative Interpretation 
The most obvious alternative interpretation of section 102 simply 
deems "actions" to include inactions.44 If defensible, such an inter-
pretation would fulfill the statutory purpose of accounting for envi-
40. 403 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975). 
41. 403 F. Supp. at 279. Two other cases reaching the same result in almost identical fact 
situations are Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and Thompson 
v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
42. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973). See note 27 supra. 
44. An alternative possibility is to view the agency's decision not to act as itself major 
federal action. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm., 481 F.2d 
1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (There is federal action "whenever an agency makes a decision 
which permits action by other parties which will affect the quality of the environment." (foot-
note omitted)); Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5. This, however, is an obvious fiction. If 
decisions amount to action by virtue of their consequences, then the decision to decide would 
in tum require an environmental impact statement, for it could potentially "significantly affect 
the environment." Indeed, the "decision" to issue a "reco=endation or report" may itself 
significantly affect the environment, if consequences and not conduct form the test for action, 
Adoption of this approach thus results in a paradoxical regress requiring an infinite number of 
impact statements. Conversely, the decision divorced from its consequences - the delibera-
tions of the administrators - cannot possibly "significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment." 
Such an interpretation would also require an EIS on traditional agency action to consider 
every possible alternative use of the resources consumed by the proposed action, since the 
decision to take that action is necessarily, given budgetary constraints, a "decision" no/ to 
pursue all alternative uses of the available resources. It will not to do to say that absent notice 
of those possibilities there is no action, because the agency always has notice of the "decision" 
it prepares to make. Since every decision to act in one way amounts to a decision not to act in 
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ronmental values in the formation of public policy. The Council on 
Environmental Quality has issued regulations explicitly adopting 
this approach. The regulations define major federal action as "ac-
tions with effects that may be major and which are potentially sub-
ject to Federal control and responsibility."45 Furthermore, action 
includes ''the circumstance where the responsible officials fail to act 
and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribu-
nals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law 
as agency action."46 This regulation incorporates the awareness that 
decisions leading to agency acquiescence in a nonf ederal activity 
may have significant environmental consequences and therefore 
should trigger the EIS requirement.47 As one commentator has ob-
countless other ways, the decisional analysis offers only an incoherent solution to the problem 
of agency inaction. 
By contrast, the approaches suggested here do not indulge such limitless semantic scope. 
By deeming discrete inactions reviewable under the APA, or particular alternative proposals 
actually put forward by private parties, as the "action" requiring an EIS, the interpretations 
defended by this Note remain limited to requiring the analysis of reasonable and well-defined 
policy alternatives. 
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1981). 
46. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1981). The relevant section reads in full: 
"Major Federal action" includes actions with effects that may be major and which are 
potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not 
have a meaning independent of significantly (§ 1508.27). Actions include the circum-
stance where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by 
courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other appli-
cable law as agency action. 
47. The court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980), dis-
cussed the new regulations, although they had not yet taken effect at the time the fact situation 
being litigated arose. The court quoted extensively from a letter from Nicholas Yost, General 
Counsel of the Department of Justice (Jan. 10, 1979). The letter enunciated the principle that 
An EIS need not be prepared ... where no Federal decisions are required and none have 
been made. Without.a Federal decision - whether that decision be to act or to refrain 
from action - there can be no "major Federal action" under NEPA. 
The letter proceeded to compare that principle with the CEQ's new regulations: 
Section 1508.18 of the NEPA regulations is consistent with this principle. The reference 
in that Section to "a failure to act" was not intended by the Council to require the prepa-
ration of an EIS where no Federal decision was required and none had been made. The 
phrase "failure to act" was intended rather to describe one possible outcome in those 
situations where a Federal decision had been or was required to be made. 
We recognize that the practical effect ofa decision not to act and no decision at all is the 
same in the circumstances of this case. In both cases, State activities on Federal lands 
may proceed. 
627 F.2d at 1238 n.6. The court adopted the position that the agency in this case was not 
required to decide, and furthermore that no decision had in fact been made. See note 95 i'!fra. 
This strained reliance on the existence of a formal, mandated decision is unwarranted. As 
noted by one commentator, "[w)hen administrative inaction has the same impact on the rights 
of a party as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision 
in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an affirmative decision denying relief." Shea, 
supra note 5, at 78 (footnote omitted). See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 
F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Just as an agency cannot avoid judicial review by casting its 
decision in terms of inaction, agencies should not be allowed to evade the requirements of 
NEPA by a similar ploy. Moreover, by petitioning for formal rulemaking pursuant to the 
APA, environmentalists can compel the agency to reach a formal decision on an action it has 
hitherto avoided. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text. 
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served, "[b]ecause the EIS is often the primary source of environ-
mental imput [sic] into agency decisionmaking, the Council's 
regulations seek to define these terms [major federal action] as 
broadly as possible, while still adhering to Congress's intent."48 
NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)49 
and empowered it by executive order to publish regulations inter-
preting NEPA.5° Courts accord considerable deference to the inter-
pretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its 
enforcement or implementation.51 The CEQ adopted new regula-
tions in response to President Carter's executive order making the 
Council's regulations binding on all federal agencies.52 lnAndrus v. 
Sierra Club, 53 the Supreme Court upheld one of the new regulations 
and stated that "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to sub-
stantial deference."54 This judicial deference gives the CEQ's regu-
48. Note, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 347, 357 (1979). 
The Note continues: 
Thus, courts have found that federal cooperation, approval, or indirect funding represents 
a sufficient level of federal involvement to require the preparation of an EIS. The regula-
tions codify this broad approach . . . . 
Id at 358. Another commentator has argued that "[t]his definition [§ 1508.18], insofar as it 
reaches actions and inactions potentially federal, appears to go beyond the definition of agency 
action used in the Administrative Procedure Act." Note, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: 
The JJoclrine of Substantial Deference lo the Regulations of the Council on Environmental Qual/-
lj', 66 VA. L. REV. 843, 860-61 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
49. 42 u.s.c. § 4341-4347 (1976). 
50. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 123 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, app. at 
592-93 (Supp. III 1979). 
The order explicitly gives the CEQ authority to publish regulations and requires federal 
agencies to "comply with the regulations issued by the Council except where such compliance 
would be inconsistent with statutory requirements." 3 C.F.R. at 124. The CEQ, however, has 
no enforcement authority over other federal agencies. 
51. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973) 
(''The point is rather, that when we face a complex problem with many hard questions and few 
easy answers we do well to pay careful attention to how other branches of Government have 
addressed the same problem."); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 
U.S. 315, 330-31 (1938) (''Thus administrative interpretation, contemporary with the legisla-
tion, and the legislative history have weight 'when choice is nicely balanced.'"); Hassett v. 
Welch, 303 U.S. 303,307 (1938) ("Ascertainment of the intended application of the .•. [reve-
nue acts] involves a reading of them in light of ... administrative interpretation."), 
52. The CEQ regulations referred to were issued in November 1978 and became effective 
on July 30, 1979. The regulations are codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1500-1508 (1981). 
53. 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
54. 442 U.S. at 358. 
The Supreme Court justified this deference on the grounds that 
The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility "to 
review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal government in 
light of the policy set forth in . . . this Act . . ., and to make recommendations to the 
President with respect thereto." 
442 U.S. at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1976)). This holding is reflective of the attitude 
that "administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned 
except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful." Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). 
The regulation upheld by the Court provided that no EIS was required on federal budget 
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lations significant weight in resolving questions of statutory 
interpretation, including the definition of major federal action. 55 
Applying the Council's definition requires determining whether 
the failure to act is reviewable under the AP A. 56 This, however, is 
easier said than done. The difficulty involves the AP A's exclusion 
from judicial review of "agency action . . . committed to agency dis-
cretion by law."57 The courts have construed this exception very 
narrowly;58 a legally sufficient commitment to agency discretion 
appropriations, which was a reversal of the previous CEQ position on the issue. This inconsis-
tency would appear to reduce the value of the regulations under the Supreme Court policy of 
according only limited weight to "administrative guidelines" which "conflicted with earlier 
pronouncements of the agency." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). 
See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932); Campbell v. Brown, 245 F.2d 662, 
666 (5th Cir. 1957). The Court, however, found that since "CEQ's reversal of interpretation 
occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of trans-
forming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies," 
any potential loss in persuasiveness from the recent change was negated. 442 U.S. at 358. 
55. Since the regulations andAndrus v. Sierra Club have appeared, few cases have consid-
ered the import of the new status of the Council's interpretation of NEPA. Several courts have 
reiterated the substantial deference to be accorded to the regulations, but none have applied 
the regulations to a difficult issue of statutory interpretation. National Indian Youth Council 
v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1981); Atlanta Coalition of the Transportation Crisis, 
Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Commn., 599 F.2d 1333, 1347 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979); City and County 
of Denver v. Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155,200 (D. Colo. 1981); Citizens for Responsible Area 
Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.N.H. 1979). 
One commentator has specifically argued that the CEQ regulations should be given great 
weight in deciding the proper definition of major federal action. "Neither applicable legisla-
tive history nor a Supreme Court opinion on this question exists. Substantial deference there-
fore seems appropriate." Note, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: The .Doctrine of Substantial 
.Deftrence to the Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. REv. 843, 861 
(1980). 
For general discussions of the new CEQ regulations, see Comment, Improving NEPA: New 
Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89 (1979); 
Note, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
347 (1979); Note,Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark· New Council on Environmental Quality Regula-
tions for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REv. 367 
(1980). 
56. See note 46 supra. While agency inaction arguably might also fall into the first part of 
the CEQ definition, i.e., for "actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially 
subject to federal control," this approach in fact concentrates not on agency inaction, but on 
the federal control the agency potentially could exercise. Such an interpretation is defended 
later in this Note. See notes 110-113 i'!fra and accompanying text. Insofar as the agency's 
failure to act is itself the "major federal action" for which plaintiffs demand the preparation of 
an EIS, the regulation specifically provides that the circumstances in which the failure to act 
amounts to major federal action are limited to those where the APA provides for judicial 
review. Given the complexities of the APA itself, it is at best superficial to pounce on the CEQ 
regulation's inclusion of "the failure to act" as indicating an unqualified EIS requirement for 
agency inaction. But see Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5, at 403 n.65. 
57. 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (1976). Superficially this exception would appear to eviscerate the 
CEQ's provision for failures to act, since an EIS can only influence decisions over which the 
agency has discretion. But the narrow interpretation given to this exception leaves many ac-
tions within the effective power of administrative agencies still subject to judicial review, and 
hence within the CEQ's category of failures to act which amount to "major federal actions" for 
NEPA p~rposes. 
58. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1977); Citizens To Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971) (''This is a very narrow exception."); Abbot Laborato-
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depends on the absence of any legal standards for the reviewing 
court to apply.59 Agency inaction, however, ranks prominently 
among the types of cases held to have satisfied the discretion excep-
tion. 60 These cases generally involve agency refusals to investigate61 
or prosecute62 behavior arguably in violation of existing law, rather 
than the failure to promulgate new rules. 
The courts have recently evinced an increasing willingness to re-
view agency refusals to implement policies proposed by private par-
ties. 63 These courts have read the exception for actions "committed 
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("Judicial review of a final agency action by an 
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was 
the purpose of Congress."); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) (exception does not 
apply unless "Congress has in express or implied terms precluded judicial review or committed 
the challenged action entirely to administrative discretion"); Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. Federal 
Trade Commn., 651 F.2d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1981) (''the Supreme Court has enunciated a 
strong presumption against precluding judicial review"). 
59. The Supreme Court applied this standard in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v, 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and it has been followed ever since. "The legislative history of the 
Administrative Procedure Act indicated that it [the exception for agency discretion] is applica-
ble in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case 
there is no law to apply.'" 401 U.S. at 410 (citing S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Isl Sess. 26 
(1945)). 
60. See, e.g., Southern R.R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979) 
(agency refusal to investigate excessive rate charges); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) 
(attorney general's refusal to object to voter registration plan under Voting Rights Act); City of 
Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 (1969). A number of reasons support this pattern. 
First, decisions not to act may result from institutional limits on the agency's resources, and 
even where those seeking to compel agency action can demonstrate a good case for action, 
only the agency is in a position to know the opportunity costs of any given exercise of its 
powers and funds. Second, the question of what rules to make, out of the infinite number of 
possibilities, does not present a concrete question suitable for judicial review, but rather a 
general question concerning the exercise of plenary authority, more susceptible to legislative or 
administrative expertise than to judicial intervention. Further, absent a particular rulemaking 
focus, no adequate record will bring before the court the information necessary to test the 
reasonableness of the administrative proceedings. All of these arguments are cogently devel-
oped - and then rejected - in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and 
Exchange Commn., 606 F.2d 1031, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
61. See, e.g., Southern R.R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979); 
Union Mechling Corp. v. United States, 566 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kixmiller v. Securities 
and Exchange Commn., 492 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
62. For cases exempting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see Georgia v. Mitchell, 
450 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970); Powell v. 
Katzenback, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
63. See WWHT, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commn., 656 F.2d 807, 814 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) ("We reject the suggestion that agency denials of requests for rulemaking are exempt 
from judicial review."); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange 
Commn., 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explicitly considering the APA issue and reviewing 
agency refusals to adopt rules requiring corporations to disclose the environmental conse-
quences of their operations in disclosure statements required by the securities laws); National 
Black Media Coalition v. Federal Communications Commn., 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(reviewing agency refusal to adopt rules without discussion of the APA issue); Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. Federal Communications Commn., 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (review-
ing agency inaction without discussion of APA issue). This development appears largely 
confined to the District of Columbia Circuit. That Circuit's role as a leader in the develop-
ment of administrative law, however, highlights the importance of these decisions. 
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to agency discretion" not to include refusals to act following full for-
mal consideration of the proposed rule.64 This interpretation greatly 
expands the scope of the CEQ's definition, for section 4( e) of the 
AP A requires each agency to permit interested individuals to peti-
tion for a rulemaking decision. 65 Established administrative law 
doctrine subjects to judicial review an agency's refusal to consider a 
matter of obvious public importance, notwithstanding the exception 
for legal commitment to agency discretion.66 Consequently, an 
64. This is the synthesis adopted in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities 
and Exchange Commn., 606 F.2d at 1047. Judge McGowan reasoned that where a formal 
agency proceeding focused narrowly on a specific set of proposed rules, the particularity of the 
issue and the adequacy of the record would blunt the objections against judicial review of 
agency inaction. The most compelling of those objections, however, tha~ only the agency 
knows where its limited resources will do the most to fulfill its statutory mandate, is made 
sharper by a full agency consideration of the possibility of employing those resources other 
than as it does. 
65. S U.S.C. § 555(e) (1976). The agency may deny the requested rulemaking without 
holding formal proceedings, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B), "when the agency for good 
cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules 
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest." See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1945), reprinted in ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79th Cong., 1944-46, s. Doc. No. 248, at 
201-02 (1946) (''The mere filing ofa petition does not require an agency to grant it, or to hold a 
hearing, or engage in any other public rule making proceedings."). 5 U.S.C § 555(e), how-
ever, requires the provision of notice and a brief statement of the grounds for decision when-
ever a request "made in connection with any agency proceeding" is denied. 
66. See Union Mechling Corp. v. United States, 566 F.2d 722, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Of 
course, in order to have its decision escape review, the Commission must actually exercise its 
discretion. If an agency simply ignores issues whose relevance to the public interest is obvious, 
the agency's decision may be reversed." (citation omitted)). The APA, in addition, requires 
notice and a brief explanation for the denial of a petition for rulemaking. See note 65 supra. 
Independent of statutory requirements to respond to requests for action, the Supreme 
Court has long held agency inaction reviewable by the courts. In Rochester Tel. Corp. v. 
United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) the court overruled the doctrine of the nonreviewability of 
"negative orders" and held reviewable a failure of the Fedeal Communications Commission to 
classify Rochester Telephone as an exempt carrier under section 2(b) of the Communications 
Act of 1913. The court stated that" '[n]egative' has really been an obfuscating adjective in that 
it implied a search for a distinction - which does not involve the real consideration on which 
rest, as we have seen, the reviewability of Commission orders within the framework of its 
discretionary authority and within the general criteria of justiciability." 307 U.S. at 141-42. 
Thus Rochester Telephone permits review of an action which "is attacked because it does 
not forbid or compel conduct by a third person." 307 U.S. at 130. This formulation of review-
able actions covers the definition of inaction, as long as the "doctrines of primary jurisdiction 
and administrative finality" are satisfied. 307 U.S. at 142. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
is "primarily applicable to controversies concerning so-called regulated industries" (e.g., the 
operations of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board). JAFFE, 
supra note 39, at 124. Hence the doctrine has little relevance to the normal NEPA suit involv-
ing the Departments of Interior, Defense, Transportation, the former Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, and the Environmental Protection Agency (Suits against these five 
agencies accounted for 69% of all NEPA cases in 1978. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
TIY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - 1979, 588). 
The doctrine of administrative finality is particularly relevant to inaction cases in which 
there is probably no concrete agency order. Two non-NEPA cases, however, held agency inac-
tion reviewable by the courts in spite of the lack of a formal agency order. In Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that the failure of 
the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend the registration of DDT under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act as requested by the plaintiffs was reviewable. The court 
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agency's refusal to implement policies put forward by an environ-
mental group could escape review (although deferential standards of 
review would almost surely preclude a finding that the refusal to act 
amounted to an abuse of discretion)67 only if the agency fully and 
fairly considered the proposal before rejecting it, but did not hold 
hearings or other formal proceedings on the proposed rule. 
This synthesis suggests an attractive interpretation of the CEQ's 
regulation. Environmentalists seeking agency action should petition 
under the AP A for the promulgation of appropriate rules. 68 The 
agency's refusal to adopt the proposed rules would amount to a re-
viewable decision if it either ignored the proposed rules or conducted 
formal proceedings to consider them. Yet the agency could, for 
"good cause," dispose of frivolous petitions by responding that after 
a full consideration of their merits it had found that "notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 
to the public interest."69 
This procedure, coupled with the NEPA-related limiting devices 
discussed in Part II, would reconcile the need to consider the envi-
ronmental consequences of agency inaction with judicial apprehen-
sions of limitless and obstructionist legal maneuvering. 
Unfortunately, this integration of administrative and environmental 
stated that "when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the 
parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in 
the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief." 428 F.2d at 1099 
(footnote omitted). 
In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. Securities and Exchange Commn., 432 F.2d 
659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that the failure of the SEC to require Dow Chemical 
Company to include in a proxy statement a resolution forbidding the company from making 
napalm was reviewable. The court required a showing of final effect from the inaction and a 
degree of formality in the inaction. It found that the Commission's decision had a final effect 
and that "no significance whatsoever inheres in the fact that the administrative determiniation 
is couched in terms of a 'no action' decision rather than in the form of a decree binding a party 
to perform or refrain from some particular act." 432 F.2d at 668. The requirement of formal-
ity was mandated by section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 under which review 
of SEC orders is authorized. This requirement would not be applicable in the usual case of 
review under section 706(1) of the APA. 
These cases demonstrate that review of many cases of inaction is possible under current 
administrative law. Thus many cases of inaction would constitute "failure to act" which is 
"reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act" as provided in the CEQ definition of 
major federal action. 
67. As Judge Edwards noted in a recent decision, "[w]e have no doubt that, except in the 
rarest cases, the decision to institute rulemaking is one that is largely committed to agency 
discretion; however, this begs the question with respect to judicial review." WWHT, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commn., 656 F.2d 807, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
68. See note 65 supra. Since "rule" under the APA includes, among other things, "the 
whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy," it will not be difficult to describe 
any proposed policy in a petition for rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). In the Defenders oj' W//d-
lffe case, for example, the plaintiffs could have petitioned the BLM to adopt a rule prohibiting 
the killing of wolves on federal lands. 
69. See note 65 supra. 
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law is as fragile as it is elegant. The extremely recent application of 
judicial review to agency inactions that follow formal proceedings 
may prove inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the discretion exception, for many agency refusals to act reflect a 
policy calculus of the very sort that leaves "no law" by which the 
reviewing courts may evaluate the agency's decision.70 And notwith-
standing the vagueness of the reviewability criterion, some inactions 
with major environmental consequences, such as administrative or 
criminal enforcement decisions, clearly fall within the exception to 
reviewability for purely discretionary decisions.71 The consideration 
of environmental values in agency decisions not to act should rest on 
a more secure legal foundation than this approach provides, even 
though it establishes a compelling, if complex, minimum standard 
for requiring impact statements in cases of agency inaction. 
C. Actions Rejected by Agencies as Proposed Major Federal Action 
The complexity and paradoxes of action/inaction distinctions, 
especially when grounded in the changing and sometimes inconsis-
tent jurisprudence of the AP A, suggest that an analytical focus on 
the inaction contemplated by the agency is misplaced. Concentrat-
ing on the action proposed by those demanding that the agency pre-
pare an EIS offers a clearer and more comprehensive approach to 
the problem of applying NEPA in cases of agency inaction. This 
Note proposes that a private petition for rulemaking pursuant to the 
AP A should be deemed "a proposal" for federal action, and that the 
consideration of such a proposal requires the agency to prepare an 
EIS if the action proposed would otherwise satisfy the criterion for 
"major federal action." 
This interpretation clearly provides for the incorporation of envi-
ronmental values in decisions to reject proposals for agency action. 
It also fully satisfies the statutory language and the CEQ regulations. 
NEPA does not require that the agency preparing the EIS favor the 
"proposal for . . . major federal action."72 The CEQ regulations 
provide very generally that a "proposal" exists when an agency "is 
actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative 
means of accomplishing [its] goal and the effects can be meaning-
fully evaluated."73 At the time the agency prepares to reject a pri-
70. Whether the Interior Department's decision to implement the vague mandate of the 
FLMPA by favoring caribou over wolves can be tested against legal standards evident on the 
face of that statute presents an exceedingly unclear question. A similar question persists with 
respect to whether an agency's decision to devote its scarce enforcement resources to cases 
other than those of interest to the plaintiffs litigating the agency's failure to act can be sub-
jected to some legal test of fidelity to statutory purpose. 
71. See notes 60, 62supra. 
72. See note 3 supra. 
73. 40 C.F.R § 1508.23 (1981). 
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vate petition for rulemaking, it prepares to decide among competing 
alternatives, action and inaction. Typically, as in Defenders of Wild-
ltfe, the environmental effects are then predictable. And the regula-
tion's definition of "major federal action" as "action with effects 
that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal con-
trol" reinforces the validity of treating policies proposed by individu-
als but disfavored by the agency itself as a "proposal" for "major 
federal action."74 
Such an interpretation does not conflict with established NEPA 
jurisprudence. The permit cases, for example, clearly involve agency 
decisions on "major federal actions" proposed by private parties, i.e., 
the developers seeking to utilize federal lands.75 And the common 
law of NEPA unanimously agrees that the heart of the Act's proce-
dural regime mandates the consideration of environmental values 
without requiring specific substantive decisions.76 It follows that an 
agency's opposition to a proposal for major federal action does not 
distinguish a case from the permit cases, where the agency favors the 
private request for federal action.77 Indeed, official indifference to 
environmental values strengthens, rather than weakens, the case for 
an EIS. 78 Of course, consideration of the "environmental impact" of 
the proposed action would, under NEPA, also require consideration 
of the available alternatives - in these cases, the status quo. Thus 
the proposed approach would result in agency consideration of the 
same environmental comparisons, without depending on metaphysi-
cal distinctions between action and inaction. Provided that the ac-
tion proposed by the plaintiffs satisfies the requirements for "major 
federal action," the same standards relied on to define the actions 
requiring impact statements when favored by agencies could also de-
74. 40 C.F.R § 1508.18 (1981). The court in JJefanders of Wildl!fe v. Andrus stated that 
because section 102(2)(C) requires an EIS on a "recommendation or report" on "proposals" 
for major federal actions, "only when an agency reaches the point in its deliberations when it is 
ready to propose a course of action need it be ready to produce an impact statement." 627 
F.2d at 1243. The court thereby excluded a case of inaction from section 102(2)(C). Neither 
NEPA nor the regulations define "recommendation or report." It is difficult, however, to im-
agine a meaningful definition which would exclude an agency's written explanation under the 
APA for its refusal to undertake major federal action as anything but a "recommendation" 
against the proposed action, and as an unfavorable "report" upon the proposal. Indeed, one of 
the virtues of the proposed interpretation is that the APA would require a formal response to 
requests for agency rulemaking. See note 65 supra. 
15. See note 7 supra; Note, Inaction as Action, supra note 5, at 404 ("All courts faced with 
the questions have construed a federal agency's grant of a license or lease to a state or private 
party to be MFA." (footnotes omitted)). 
16. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. 
77. The agency cannot itself initiate the proposal to approve a private request for a lease or 
license; it follows that the fact that the proposed action originates outside the agency is not 
dispositive ofits status as a "proposal" for major federal action. In short, it appears impossible 
to distinguish a private request for permission to conduct private activity significantly affecting 
the environment from a private request to prevent the same environmental effects. 
78. See notes 23-24 supra. 
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fine the need for an impact statement when the agency inclines 
against implementing the proposed action. 
D. NEPA's Purposes and the Costs of Procedural Solutions 
Congress, through section 102, ordered that "to the fullest extent 
possible," all laws, regulations and policies be administered consis-
tent with NEPA's broad policy goals.79 Exempting inaction cases 
from federal action, and thus from the EIS requirement, often frus-
trates these goals and conflicts with NEPA's procedural emphasis.80 
Such an interpretation allows federal agencies, on an informal basis, 
to make decisions not to act in the face of nonf ederal activity which 
they could prevent and which could lead to far-reaching environ-
mental effects. In other cases, exclusion of inaction from the EIS 
requirement would furnish opportunities for purposeful evasion of 
NEPA's mandate to consider carefully environmental effects before 
initiating agency projects.81 Given the availability of statutory inter-
pretations more faithful to NEPA's purposes, the courts should re-
vise their approach to agency inaction. The CEQ's inclusion of 
reviewable agency inaction in the category of "major federal action" 
offers a fully justified, but limited, step in this direction. A more 
natural reading of the statute would focus on the action proposed by 
those seeking judicial review of the agency's refusal to prepare an 
EIS, rather than on the inaction favored by the agency. Such a read-
ing of section 102 offers the most coherent solution to cases of agency 
inaction, by simultaneously honoring the language and purposes of 
the Act. 
Naturally, some limitations on the scope of section 102 in inac-
tion cases is necessary to prevent NEPA from becoming an intolera-
ble burden on federal agencies, 82 and it is to that issue that Part II 
now turns. But given NEPA's broad goals, its language when read 
in light of these goals, its legislative history, and CEQ interpretations 
of 102(2)(C), courts should resolve any uncertainty in the definition 
of major federal action liberally,83 so that decisionmakers bear in 
mind the environmental consequences not only of their actions, but 
of their inactions. 
II. LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
In a case involving a federally proposed project, the agency first 
79. See notes 3, 20 supra and accompanying text. 
80. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
81. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See Iowa Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
83. See note 17 supra. 
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looks to the process outlined in the CEQ regulations84 to determine 
if implementation of the project would consititute major federal ac-
tion requiring an EIS. First, the agency tries to categorize the action. 
The regulations direct agencies to prepare an EIS if the action is one 
which "normally requires an environmental [impact] statement."85 
Alternatively, an agency may decide not to prepare an EIS, or even 
an environmental assessment, 86 if it determines that the action de-
serves a categorical exclusion, 87 that is, if the action belongs in a 
"category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have 
a significant effect on the human environment."88 Second, in the 
event an action is not easily categorized, the agency must prepare an 
environmental assessment, which provides a preliminary environ-
mental analysis of the project.89 The agency then decides, based on 
the assessment, whether to commence EIS preparation or to issue a 
".finding ofno significant impact" [FONS!] to the interested public.90 
84. In determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement the Federal 
agency shall: 
(a} Determine under its procedures supplementing these regulations (described in 
§ 1507.3) whether the proposal is one which: 
(1) Normally requires an environmental statement, or 
(2) Normally does not require either an environmental impact statement or an envi-
ronmental assessment (categorical exclusion). 
(b} If the proposed action is not covered by paragraph (a} of this section, prepare an 
environmental assessment (§ 1508.9). 
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1981). Agencies may also adopt their own procedures to supplement those 
of the CEQ. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (1981). 
85. 40 C.F.R. § 150l.4(a}(I} (1981). 
86. See notes 88·89 infra and accompanying text. 
87. See 40 C.F.R. § 150l.4(a)(2) (1982); see also note 84 supra. 
88. "Categorical Exclusion" means a category of actions which do not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have been 
found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a federal agency in implementation 
of these regulations(§ 1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an environmental assess-
ment nor an environmental impact statement is required .... 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1981), 
89. "Environmental Assessment": 
(a} Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible that serves 
to: 
(I} Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an 
environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact. 
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact statement is 
necessary. 
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary. 
(b} Shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives as required 
by 102(2}(E} [42 U.S.C. § 4332(2}(E} (1976)), of the environmental impacts of the pro-
posed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted. 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1981). 
90. See 40 C.F.R. § 150l.4(e} (1981). 
The CEQ regulations define a finding of no significant impact as follows: 
"Finding of No Significant Impact" means a document by a Federal agency briefly 
presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded (§ 1508.4), will not have a 
significant effect on the human environment and for which an environmental impact 
statement therefore will not be prepared. It shall include the environmental assessment or 
a summary of it and shall note any other environmental documents related to it 
(§ 150l.7(a)(5}}. If the assessment is included, the finding need not repeat any of the 
discussion in the assessment but may incorporate it by reference. 
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In an inaction case, the primary activity under consideration is, 
by definition, nonf ederal. Yet once an agency is aware of the 
nonfederal activity, and determines it has the authority to stop it, it 
could apply the CEQ regulations in a similar manner. Inclusion of 
inaction under NEPA has prompted the objection that the task of 
identifying possible instances of inaction on which to prepare EISs, 
and the need to prepare statements when necessary, will overwhelm 
the agencies subjected to these requirements.91 This Note suggests 
three principles to help agencies deal with requests for EISs in inac-
tion cases. First, if the courts do no more than follow the CEQ's 
interpretation, the limitations on the reviewability of agency inaction 
under the AP A will limit the need for impact statements to those 
private requests for agency action sufficiently plausible to merit for-
mal consideration. Second, unless an agency is formally notified of 
prospective nonfederal activity, and has the authority to prevent it, 
no EIS should be required. Third, the agency should, in the first 
instance, determine its own jurisdiction under a categorical exclusion 
procedure analogous to that applied under the CEQ regulations to 
review the substantive nature of the activity.92 
These principles directly respond to the practical objections to 
requiring an impact statement in cases of agency inaction. Their im-
plementation will eliminate the need for agencies to identify inaction 
cases, and will allow agencies to dispose of any frivolous requests 
quickly. Those requests that remain will create extra work for agen-
cies,93 but will ensure that agencies carefully consider issues that the 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1981). 
91. The objections to the broad definition of major federal action were best expressed in 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus: 
No agency could meet its NEPA obligations ifit had to prepare an environmental impact 
statement every time the agency had power to act but did not do so. Nor does it suffice to 
say that an agency's burden would be kept to a reasonable level by the fact that no impact 
statement is needed when the inaction could have no significant environmental results, for 
we have held that an agency which decided not to issue an impact statement must provide 
a written explanation for its reasons for that decision. . . . It would be an imaginative 
and vigorous agency indeed which could identify and prepare all the statements and ex-
planations appellees' reading of NEPA would have the statute demand. 
627 F.2d at 1246. One commentator has raised the objection that allowing inaction as a form 
of major federal action would improperly involve courts in initial determinations of agency 
jurisdiction. See Fergenson, supra note 8, at 518-23. This objection is considered in note ll5 
infra. 
92. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text. 
93. The number of additional EISs which will be required in inaction cases is impossible to 
estimate. A major source of inaction cases is likely to be new state proposals for major actions 
on federal lands which an agency has power to control. The number of such major projects is 
probably limited, but the potential environmental impacts are great. 
The burden of preparing additional EISs is mitigated by the new requirements of the CEQ 
regulations on the length of EISs. The regulations seek to streamline the EIS process by re-
stricting the documents to 150 pages for a normal EIS and 300 pages for an EIS "of unusual 
scope or complexity," and by instituting other procedures for reducing paperwork and delay. 
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4, 1500.5 (1981). The costs of preparing EISs in 1974 was estimated at 
1.2 percent of the annual budget of the Corps of Engineers. The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
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Congress, through NEPA, deemed essential to the rational formula-
tion of public policy. 
A. Agency Notice 
The fulfillment of NEPA's procedural purposes requires limiting 
the inactions that trigger the EIS provision to cases of an agency's 
deliberate decision not to act.94 Thus, plaintiffs in inaction suits must 
demonstrate agency awareness of the nonf ederal activity at issue. If 
an agency fails to prevent a nonfederal activity that it is aware of, 
and could prevent, then a conclusive presumption should arise that 
the agency decided not to intervene. That is, an assumption should 
be made that not to decide is to decide.95 Such a presumption would 
prevent agencies from avoiding NEP A's mandate by ignoring 
nonf ederal activities and making decisions by default. Independent 
of such a presumption, plaintiffs could avoid informal decisionmak-
ing by a formal petition for agency action pursuant to the APA.96 
Identifying instances of authority to prevent impending 
nonf ederal activity will not overwhelm government agencies if they 
need only respond to private petitions in such cases, rather than ful-
fill a duty to discover them. Instead, plaintiffs will know that, in the 
event of litigation, agency awareness will constitute an element of 
the prima facie case of agency inaction improperly decided upon 
without an EIS. A formal request for the agency to enjoin tempora-
rily the nonfederal activity arguably within its authority, pending 
completion of an EIS, offers one possibility of proving notice; a for-
mal petition for rulemaking under the APA, however, would provide 
undeniable proof of notice and agency reaction.97 Such a request 
would notify the agency of the nonf ederal activity's existence and the 
sion put its NEPA expenditures for 1975 at $14.9 million, or about 2.2 percent of the cost of 
one nuclear power plant. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 45 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT]. Thus the costs of EIS preparation are not over-
whelming agencies, and the additional costs from inaction cases are unlikely to expand this 
financial burden significantly. 
94. Thus, "conscious inaction" can be distinguished from "true inaction," where an agency 
does not intervene because it is unaware of the nonfederal activity. See Note, Inaction as 
Action, supra note 5, at 399-400. 
95. "At some level, of course, an agency cannot avoid 'deciding' whether to act when, as 
here, it has been asked to act and has declined to do so. That is the point of the cliche that 'not 
to decide is to decide.'" Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1247 n.6 (D,C. Cir. 
1980). Despite this recognition, the court refused to apply the EIS requirement because the 
appellees themselves had argued that the Secretary had not decided and because the court 
believed that the Secretary was not compelled to decide whether to intervene. 
96. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
97. A "request" will be used to refer to a communication from a private party seeking 
agency intervention in a nonfederal activity or, in lieu of such intervention, the preparation of 
an EIS on the agency's inaction. 
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possibility of intervention.98 The agency would then worry only 
about specific requests for intervention, avoiding the burden of em-
ploying a separate staff to discover every possible exercise of author-
ity which it is not pursuing. 99 
Although the notice requirement removes the burden of actively 
identifying inaction cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
the number of requests which agencies will receive. Nonetheless, 
trends indicate that the number of requests is unlikely to prove un-
duly burdensome. CEQ data reveal that in 1975, agencies assessed 
about 30,000 administrative actions to determine whether EISs were 
required. 100 During the same year federal agencies filed over 6,000 
draft EISs; 101 only 143 NEPA cases reached the courts. 102 Since en-
vironmental groups must choose their law suits carefully within 
financial limits, 103 they are unlikely to respond to the acceptance of a 
broad definition of major federal action by filing a wave of NEPA 
suits. 104 
Similarly, the filing of a request for intervention and an EIS with 
98. The requirement of notice by plaintiffs will not inhibit the bringing of legitimate suits 
for EISs on inaction. The requirement can be satisfied by showing receipt of a written request 
by the agency and hence the burden should not deter legitimate plaintiffs. Furthermore, a 
potential NEPA plaintiff would be unlikely to incur the expense of filing a suit to compel EIS 
preparation without first requesting the agency to prepare one voluntarily. The opinion in 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus indicates that plaintiffs first asked the Department of Interior 
to prepare an EIS and only filed suit when the Department failed to respond. 627 F.2d 1238, 
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
99. Agencies can, of course, prepare EISs on cases of inaction which they themselves dis-
cover. The scheme of responding only to requests for EISs on inaction represents a minimum 
of compliance which agencies are free to exceed depending on the relative burden of respond-
ing to the external requests. 
100. CEQ REPORT, supra note 93, at 32. 
101. CEQ REPORT, supra note 93, at 32. 
102. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 122 (1977). 
The number of suits filed under NEPA reached a high of 189 in 1974, but dropped to 119 in 
1976, 108 in 1977, 114 in 1978, and 139 in 1979. Liroff, NEPA Litigation in the 1970's: A Deluge 
or a Dribble?, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 315, 321 (1981). 
103. Liroff, supra note 102 at 325-26. Liroff notes that "the expense of a lawsuit and the 
courts' disdain for frivolous litigation discourages the abuse of the litigation opportunities af-
forded by NEPA." Id at 325. On the expense of litigation, see Henson & Gray, Injunction 
Bonding in Environmental Litigation, 19 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 541, 551-52, 554 (1979); Hig-
ginbotham, Does the System Cause Excessive Legal Fees?, 14 FORUM 681 (1979); Note, Envi-
ronmental Financing Litigation, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 679,679 (1979) (the note cites costs and 
attorney's fees of $100,976.14 awarded in the case of NRDC v. Costle, 12 Envt. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1181 (D.D.C. 1978)); Comment,Afler Alyeska· Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 
16 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 276, 310 (1976). 
104. Plaintiffs would have to seek temporary injunctions to preserve the status quo while a 
case is decided. The standard for obtaining a temporary injunction alone screens out most 
frivolous suits at an early stage. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 116 (1970). The 
plaintiff must show that he is likely to succeed when the case is decided on the merits; that he 
will suffer irreparable injury to legal rights if relief is not granted; that the harm to the defend-
ant in the case ofan injunction does not outweigh the harm to the plaintiff in case ofno relief; 
and that the public interest is served by granting the injunction. Henson & Gray, supra note 
103, at 545-46. 
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an agency requires a certain, albeit smaller, commitment of re-
sources. The resources needed to document the nonfederal activ-
ity, 105 to develop a colorable claim of agency authority, and to 
prepare correspondence to the agency - much less a formal rule-
making petition - may alone limit the number of requests filed. 
Part B outlines a procedure which would allow agencies to deal sum-
marily with those requests which are actually filed but which seek 
intervention clearly outside the agency's authority. Federal agencies 
already assess 30,000 actions annually to determine the necessity of 
EISs. With the proposed safeguards, the agencies will probably not 
be overly burdened by the incremental increase due to requests in 
inaction contexts, even as they more effectively apply NEPA's 
mandate. 
B. Agency .Determination of Authority 
Although a notice requirement will eliminate the need for agen-
cies to spend time actively identifying inaction cases, the requests 
that do appear will require consideration. Opponents of inclusion of 
inaction as action may argue that agencies will be overburdened by 
the need to produce detailed statements of reasons in those cases 
where they deny a request for an EIS. 106 The agencies often may 
issue these statements summarily, under the substantive categorical 
exclusion outlined in the CEQ regulations107 - if the nonfederal ac-
tivity belongs to a class of activities which "do not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environ-
105. The requirement that a nonfederal activity must have a significant environmental im-
pact should be reiterated here. This requirement flows directly from section 102(2)(C)'s lan-
guage. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). A change in the environmental status quo has been 
adopted by courts as a requirement of major federal action. See, e.g., Burbank Anti-Noise 
Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980) ("An EIS is not required, however, 
when the proposed federal action will effect no change in the status quo."), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 965 (1981); Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002-03 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) ("The duty to prepare an EIS normally is triggered when there is a proposal to 
change the status quo."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 
895, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978), (1979) ("(S]ection 102(2)(C) contemplates a 'proposal' for taking 
new action which significantly changes the status quo.") revd. on other grounds, 442 U.S. 347. 
This requirement eliminates the fear that the bare existence of authority would be sufficient for 
invoking NEPA, a reservation expressed by the court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 
F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and given as a reason why action should not be defined broadly to 
cover inaction. 627 F.2d at 1247-48 (quoting letter from Nicholas Yost, General Counsel of 
the CEQ, to the Department of Justice (Jan. IO, 1979)); see notes 5, 9 supra. 
106. Whenever an agency refuses a private request to prepare an EIS, the agency is ex-
pected to notify the private party of the reasons for the refusal. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(l) 
(1981). See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Federal Power Commn., 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (statement of reasons for a refusal to prepare an EIS is the minimum for compliance 
with NEPA). But cf. Schere v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1972) (statement of rea-
sons for a refusal to prepare an EIS is not required, but would be preferred and would greatly 
assist judicial review). 
107. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
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ment," 108 the agency may apply a categorical exclusion and refuse to 
prepare an EIS. In such a case, the agency may, but need not, 109 
prepare an environmental assessment and prepare a detailed state-
ment of reasons for denial of the EIS request. 
This Note proposes that determinations of authority in inaction 
cases also follow a summary procedure. The courts should fashion a 
'Jurisdictional" categorical exclusion for any case where an agency 
plainly lacks the authority to prevent the nonfederal activity com-
plained of. This process is usually unnecessary in the case of a fed-
eral project or program, since there the determination of agency 
authority happens well before EIS preparation, when the project or 
program is first proposed. The summary procedure makes this de-
termination part of inaction cases, and simplifies an agency's task of 
dealing with requests for intervention and EISs. When an agency 
receives a request, it should first consider whether it possesses the 
authority to prevent the nonfederal activity. If such authority exists, 
either inaction would constitute federal action or the proposed exer-
cise of authority would itself amount to potential federal action, and 
the agency must then proceed to consider whether the nonfederal 
activity in question significantly impacts the environment.110 If no 
authority exists, the agency can summarily deny the request and sim-
ply furnish the requesting party with the reason for the refusal to 
intervene and for the EIS denial. Difficult cases of interpreting stat-
utory mandates may arise in inaction cases just as they do in cases of 
agency projects. 111 Nevertheless, the burden on an agency of deter-
mining whether it has authority to prevent a particular nonfederal 
activity should not overtax the agency's resources. First, agencies 
continually determine their own statutory authority in their daily ac-
tivities and reviewing courts accord their determinations substantial 
deference. 112 Second, many requests will lend themselves to 
108. See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text. 
109. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1981). 
I 10. In other words, if an inaction request cannot be excluded for lack of authority, the 
agency must examine the environmental impact of the nonfederal project under the steps out-
lined above to determine if an EIS is needed. See notes 84-90 supra and accompanying text. 
111. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (suit concerning the authority of EPA to regulate under the Clean Air Act), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 959 (1977). 
The agency should not be intimidated by the fear of being bound by its decisions about its 
authority because an agency is not firmly subject to stare decisis. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TEXT§ 17.07 (3d ed. 1972); Pittman, The Doctrine ef Precedents and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 544 (1936-37). However, the agency 
would be unlikely to claim no authority as a matter of course because the courts may later 
invalidate a contrary decision on authority if the agency appears to have acted arbitrarily. See 
K. DAVIS, supra, at§ 17.07; Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Deci-
sions, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 138 (1957). 
112. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) ("That rule [of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies] has been repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, 
the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter." 
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straightforward analysis. 113 Third, the research burden on agencies 
could be eased by placing a burden on those who request agency 
intervention and EIS preparation to come forward with a colorable 
claim of agency authority as part of the request. 
The proposed procedure would minimize the agencies' appre-
hended burden of continually supplying explanations for EIS deni-
als.114 Allowing summary rejection of requests for intervention and 
an EIS based on an initial determination of no authority will enable 
the expeditious disposition of frivolous requests without the need for 
a detailed statement of reasons for the denial of each request, t ts 
The courts can accord agency interpretations of their statutory 
authorizations varying weight, from force of law, to no weight, to 
some intermediate degree. 116 The standard for judicial review of 
agency decisions under NEPA has stirred debate, particularly since 
(footnote omitted)); Maremont Corp. v. Federal Trade Commn .• 431 F.2d 124. 127 (7th Cir. 
1970) ("(J]urisdictional questions which are really determined by the facts of the case must first 
be decided by the agency which has been charged with enforcement."); Securities and Ex-
change Commn. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir.) ("[l]t has long 
been established that the question of the inclusion of a particular person or entity within the 
coverage of a regulatory statute is generally for intitial determination by an agency."), cert. 
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. 928, 
932 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (where agency has supervisory power over a regulatory scheme, unique 
technical expertise in the disputed area, and had already commenced hearings, it would be an 
abuse of discretion for the court to act before the plaintiffi; brought their complaint to the 
agency). 
The reason for this attitude of the courts "is that agencies tend to be familiar with, and 
sophisticated about, statutes that they are charged with administering. This expertise is as-
sumed to result not only from the frequency of an agency's contact with the statute, but also 
from its immersion in day-to-day administrative operations that reveal the practical conse-
quences of one statutory interpretation as opposed to another." Woodward & Levin, In De-
fense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 Ao. L. REV. 329 (1979). See note 51 
supra and accompanying text; note 130 ,iifra. 
113. For example, in Defenders of Wild/fie v. Andnts, the plaintiffs alleged that the agency 
had authority to stop the wolf-kill under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. The 
applicable section of the Act requires that "[t]he Secretary [of Interior] shall manage the public 
lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield .... " Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, § 302(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1976). The regulations of the Depart-
ment of Interior state that: 
The Federal agencies may, after consultation with the States, close all or any portion of 
land under their jurisdiction to public hunting, fishing or trapping in order to protect the 
public safety or to prevent damage to Federal lands or resources thereon, and may impose 
such other restrictions as are necessary to comply with management objectives. 
43 C.F.R. § 24.3(b) (1981). This regulation and the supporting statute demonstrate that the 
Department of Interior had authority to prevent the wolf-kill. See Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Andrus, 9 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2111, 2115 (D.D.C. 1977). 
114. For a discussion of the potential burdens, see Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 
F.2d 1238, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
I 15. The categorical exclusion procedure also answers the objection that the inclusion of 
inaction under major federal ~ction would result in courts becoming the initial judge of agency 
authority in contravention of the primary jurisdiction rule. See Fergenson, supra note 8, at 
519-22. The agency is given a chance, upon request to prepare an EIS, to decide on its own 
jurisdiction. This decision can later be reviewed by a court if a suit is brought to compel 
preparation of the EIS. See id. 
I 16. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 60 (2d ed. 1979). 
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NEPA is silent on the subject.117 Recent Supreme Court cases indi-
cate that while NEPA requires courts to ensure full compliance with 
the procedural elements of the EIS process, substantive decisions ar-
rived at as a result of the EIS process merit reversal only when they 
are "arbitrary and capricious."118 This complies with the "principle 
of full inquiry,"119 and the "hard look" doctrine120 favoring inten-
117. Because of NEP A's silence, review usually is sought under the judicial review sections 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) (APA). Section 702 of the 
APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof." Section 706 outlines standards for judicial review: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court 
shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; 
or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by 
the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those 
parts ofit cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 
The APA is applicable to NEPA since the APA declares that a "[s]ubsequent statute may not 
be held to supersede or modify" the judicial review provisions "except to the extent that it does 
so expressly" 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1976), which NEPA does not. For cases applying the APA to 
NEPA, see, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 226 (1980); 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1283 n.1 (1st Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Hassel, 503 F. 
Supp. 552, 560 (S.D. Ala. 1980), qffd, 636 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981); see Shea, supra note 5, at 
76-81. 
118. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978), Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, endorsed the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard and stated: 
NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the 
agencies is essentially procedural. It is to ensure a fully informed and well-considered 
decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this court 
would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. 
(citation omitted). Two years later, in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980), the Court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that 
Vermont Yankee cuts sharply against the ... conclusion that an agency, in selecting a 
course of action, must elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considera-
tions. On the contrary, once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural 
requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the 
environmental consequences; it cannot "interject itself with the area of discretion of the 
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." 
119. For a discussion of the "principle" of full inquiry, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, 
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 104-07 (1981). 
120. E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1975) ("The only role for a court 
is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences . . . ."); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (if the 
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sive judicial review to ensure that agencies fully analyze a problem 
before reaching a conclusion, while generally deferring to agencies' 
technical expertise on the merits of the substantive decisions 
reached. 
Before entering the EIS writing process, however, agencies must 
make several threshold decisions under NEPA: whether the action is 
major, whether the action is federal, and whether the action signifi-
cantly affects the environment.121 While some courts review thresh-
old decisions under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 122 many 
have moved to a somewhat stricter standard, 123 reversing when the 
agency did not act reasonably in reaching a decision. 124 
An argument can be made that the success of the proposed cate-
gorical exclusion procedure depends upon a severely limited scope 
of judicial review. This line of reasoning would posit that the sum-
mary procedure is designed so agencies can expeditiously deal with 
dubious requests for EISs in inaction situations. The incentive for 
private parties to litigate denials of requests will be low given an 
agency has taken a "hard look" at environmental consequences, court will not interject itself in 
the area of executive discretion); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications 
Commn., 444 F.2d 841,851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (court should see if the agency has "taken a 'hard 
look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making" 
before it intervenes); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1804, 1811 {1978). 
121. See Shea, supra note 3, at 68-76; notes 5, 9 supra and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229-30 (7th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Maryland National Capital Park & Planning 
Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hanly v. 
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
123. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975); Minnesota Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. 
Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973); Co=ent, NEPA Threshold .Determinations: A 
Framework of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 82-87 (1976). 
124. The basis for this standard stems from the Supreme Court's decision in National La-
bor Relations Bd. v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), involving the interpretation by the Board of 
the term "employee" in the National Labor Relations Act. The Court held that the Board's 
determination was to be accepted if it had " 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in 
the law." 322 U.S. at 131. 
The reasonableness standard seems to be in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In reviewing the Secretary 
of Transportation's approval of federal financing for a highway through a public park, the 
Court established a two-step review of agency decisions under the Department of Transporta-
tion Act: reviewing under a reasonableness standard whether the agency acted within the scope 
of its authority, and then applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the actual 
decision. 401 U.S. at 415-16. 
Since Overton Park did not involve NEPA, however, it does not directly answer the thresh-
old issues, and courts have differed as to its applicability. Compare, e.g. Save Our Ten Acres v. 
Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1973) (reading Overton Park to require higher standard 
of judicial review for threshold decisions than for later agency decisions), with Faircrest Site 
Opposition Co=. v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (applying arbitrary and capri-
cious standard to all agency determinations). See Shea, supra note 5, at 88-99; Comment, 
NEPA Threshold .Determinations: A Framework of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 83-84 
(1976). 
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arbitrary and capricious standard. This would allow agencies to 
make decisions confident that they would not be challenged, or that 
in the event of litigation, they would generally be upheld. Moreover, 
the disincentive to litigate would reduce the possibility of overbur-
dening an already crowded federal court docket. 
Nevertheless, the success of the jurisdictional categorical exclu-
sion does not depend on_ severely limited judicial review. First, 
while including inaction as action will increase the amount of re-
quests for EISs, it should not lead to a host of frivolous requests. 125 
Second, if denials in frivolous cases are challenged in court, they will 
probably be disposed of quickly by summary judgment. Finally, a 
more searching standard of review will ensure that the categorical 
exclusion proposal will not be abused. If courts are virtually bound 
by agency determinations, then agencies can decide when to prepare 
impact statements by setting high threshold levels below which 
NEPA would not apply.126 Since NEPA was part of Congress' re-
sponse to agency capture by special interest groups, 127 such abuse is 
not unthinkable. NEPA instructs all federal agencies to consider en-
vironmental matters in decisionmaking.128 Given the inconvenience 
of EIS preparation assumed by the underlying objection to overbur-
dening agencies, an impartial check may provide needed encourage-
ment for agencies to handle requests for intervention and an 
accompanying EIS with open minds and in good faith. 129 Given 
agencies' familiarity with the statutes they administer, the courts will 
review with substantial deference any decision they make.130 Partic-
ularly in the area of jurisdiction, courts are uniquely suited to pro-
viding such a check and ensuring that agency statutory 
interpretation does not circumvent the important goals Congress ex-
pressed when enacting NEPA.13 1 
CONCLUSION 
The courts can apply the limiting principles suggested here to re-
125. See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text. 
126. F. ANDERSON, NEPA lN THE COURTS 101 (1973). 
127. See id at 104; B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 119, at 7. 
128. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 106 (1973). 
129. Id at 104 (1973). 
130. See National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst; 322 U.S. lll, 130 (1944) (Board's 
determination given deference because of its "everyday experience in the administration of the 
statute."); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (agency interpretations relegated 
to a role of "guidance" based on ''the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.");see notes 51, ll2supra and accompa-
nying text. 
131. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415 (1971) (Secretary's 
decision on scope of his authority entitled to a "presumption of regularity, ••• [b)ut that 
presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.") 
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move some of the objections that have been raised against requiring 
an impact statement in cases of agency inaction. Any such require-
ment in inaction cases will, of course, increase the federal agencies' 
workloads. Agencies would be required to prepare EISs which they 
formerly could have avoided. The agencies would also be required 
to answer more requests for EISs, which will involve answering 
questions concerning their statutory mandates. An increase in the 
workload of agencies, however, does not suffice to defeat the impor-
tant congressional purposes behind NEPA. Since NEP A's inception, 
the courts have held that "[c]onsideration of adminstrative difficulty, 
delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip the section [102] of its 
fundamental importance."132 Because the procedural requirements 
of that section become, if anything, more important when agencies 
decide not to exercise their authority, the courts should not hesitate 
to adopt statutorily reasonable and practically feasible approaches to 
applying the EIS requirement in cases of agency inaction. 
132. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 
449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
